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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
INTERSTATE ELECTRIC COMPANY and 
HOME INSURANCE C011PANY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COM1'1ISSION OF UTAH 
and MICHAEL E. INSKEEP, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 15791 
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY BRIEF 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE 48-HOUR PERIOD WITHIN WHICH AN EMPLOYEE, CLAIMING TO HAVE 
SUFFERED INJURY IN THE SERVICE OF HIS PIPLOYER, ~1UST GIVE 
NOTICE TO HIS EMPLOYER OF THE TIME AND PLACE WHERE THE ACCIDENT 
AND INJURY OCCURRED AND THF. NATURE OF THE SAME BEGINS TO RUN 
WHEN THE EMPLOYEE FIRST GAINS KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACCIDENT AND 
INJURY. 
Defendant Inskeep claims that the 48-hour notice period 
set forth in Section 35-1-99, Utah Code Annotated (1953), as 
amended, should run from the time the employee first gains 
knowledge that he may have a comuensable injury arising out of 
the accident. In support of his claim, he cites the case of 
Salt Lake City vs. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 436, 140 P.2d 
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644 (1943). However, the Salt Lake City case clearly does not 
stand for such a proposition. In fact, a careful reading of 
the Salt Lake City case reveals that the Court there refused 
to define an injury as one that is compensable, as suggested 
i 
by defendant Inskeep. There, the defendant, while playing hand-I 
ball in the course of his employment with plaintiff Salt Lake i 
City, was struck in the eye by a handball. Although the injun; 
obstensibly healed, his vision later began to become impaired. 
Approximately 14 months after the accident, he sought medical 
help and was informed that his eye would have to be removed 
because it had developed a sarcoma of the choroid. The de-
fendant filed a claim with the Industrial Commission, and it 
held that his injury, including the loss of his eye as a re-
sult of the sarcoma, was compensable. The plaintiff, Salt 
Lake City, filed a petition for writ of review, wherein it 
alleged that the defendant's claim was barred because he 
failed to give it notice of the accident and injury within one 
year from the date of the accident. The court held that Salt 
Lake City had received notice of the accident and injury througn 
the defendant's supervisor, who was playing handball with him 
at the time of the accident and injury. Salt Lake City then 
argued that the notice given was insufficient. In response, 
the court stated: 
In so contending it (Salt Lake City) urges 
that the statute uses the term "injury" to 
mean an injury which has resulted from a 
disability which will entitle the employee to 
-2-
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compensation. Under such a construction of 
t~e section the emnloyee would be required, 
within a year from the date of the accident 
to give his emnloyer notice of the accident' 
and also notice that this accident had re-
sulted in an injury which had caused a com-
pensable disability. Often accidental in-
juries do not result in disability within a 
year. It thus becomes evident that what the 
City is really contending is that Section 
42-1-92 limits comnensation to those acciden-
tal injuries which result within a year in 
disability. Those injuries which do not 
result in loss of work, require medical 
attention, etc., until more than a year after 
the date of the accident would, under this 
construction, be excluded from the scope of 
the Act. 
This section, however, cannot be so construed. 
We find no cases, and none are cited, which 
have given such a construction to statutes 
requiring the employee to give the employer 
notice of the accident and injury within a 
prescribed period of time. But quite to the 
contrary the cases uniformly hold that such 
statutes were designed to give the employer 
an opportunity to ~ake an early investigation 
of the circumstances surrounding the alleged 
accident and to insure hi~ the opportunity of 
giving prornnt and uroner medical care where 
it is deemed necessary. Such statutes also 
protect employers against fraudulent claims 
and give them an opportunity to remedy de-
fects so as to prevent similar accidents in 
the future. (Cases cited) 
We have held that the Industrial Act ~ust be 
liberally construed and that by such construc-
tion we should attemut to effectuate its bene-
ficient and humane objects. (Case cited) 
We therefore will not construe this provision, 
which was obviously designed to protect em-
ployers by requiring nrompt notice of injuries 
and accidents, as a limitation on the scope 
and coverage of the Act. The plain language 
of the Act re uires onl notice of the "acci-
ent an injury." Ernp asis a 
- 3 -
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In the Salt Lake City case, the plaintiff, Salt 
Lake City, asked the Court to define the term "injury", for 
Workmen's Compensation purposes, to mean an injury which 
has resulted in a disability which will entitle an employee 
to compensation. The Court refused to accede to its 
request, and such refusal resulted in a holding that an 
injured employee need not, within one year, notify his em-
ployer that his injury may be compensable as well as notify 
it of the accident and the injury itself. 
In the case at bar, defendant Inskeep has asked the 
Court to define the term "injury" as a compensable injury. His 
requested definition is clearly similar to that proposed by 
Salt Lake City in the Salt Lake City case. Here, as there, 
the Court should reject such a definition for the following 
reasons. 
First, in the Salt Lake City case, the Court re-
fused to accept Salt Lake City's requested definition of the 
term "injury" because such would not effectuate the beneficient 
and humane objects of the Industrial Act. In the case at 
bar, were defendant Inskeep's requested similar definition 
of the term "injury" accepted by the Court, an injured employee 
would not have to report an accident and injury until such 
time as, in his mind, it became compensable. As a practical 
matter, such realization could occur at any time after the 
occurrence of an accident and injury, and the employee would 
-4-
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then merely have to notify his employer of the accident and 
injury or report to it for medical treatment within 48 hours 
of such realization, provided that his claim was not otherwise 
barred. Of course, such could effectively thwart the purpose 
and intent of Section 35-1-99 and the beneficient and humane 
objects of the Workmen's Compensation Act, inasmuch as it 
could possibly deny an injured employee the benefit of prompt 
and competent medical care and may also effectively prevent 
his employer from making early investigation so as to foreclose 
fraudulent claims and from remedying any defects or problems 
that may have caused or contributed to the employee's acci-
dent and injury. Further, it would effectively gut the 
48-hour notice requirement contained in Section 35-1-99 
inasmuch as the employee could decide, as a practical matter, 
the time at which the 48-hour notice period could commence. 
The case at bar illustrates the disservice which 
could result to workingmen generally were the 48-hour notice 
period to commence when an injured employee decides that his 
injury is compensable. Defendant Inskeep, at page 3 of his 
brief, states that he "testified that initially he felt his 
back was strained and that he could continue to work given 
medication and self-imposed exercise." At page 5 of his 
brief, we learn that, not only did he take self-imposed ex-
ercise, but he "took Bufferin pursuant to prior instructions 
-5-
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received from Dr. Carson as a remedy to a prior strain." 
Consequently, he concludes that, inasmuch as he treated him-
self, he received medical treatment within 48 hours of the 
accident and injury. It is respectfully submitted that the 
48-hour notice period was designed, among other purposes, to 
reduce and eventually erradicate such self-treatment. Had 
defendant Inskeep reported the accident and injury to nlain-
tiff Interstate Electric Company or reported to it for medical 
treatment as soon as he knew he had strained his back, he 
likely would have been told to leave work and immediately seek 
licensed medical advice. Instead, he elected, having con-
sulted with himself, to continue to work for another week, 
certainly aggravating the sprain and damage which occurred 
to his back as a result of the accident. Consequently, throo~ 
his failure to notify plaintiff Interstate Electric Company I 
of his accident and injury or report to it for medical treat-
ment with 48 hours of the accident and injury, defendant In-
skeep probably aggravated his injuries. Had he thought that 
he would lose 15% of any award which he may ultimately re-
ceive as a result of his accident and injury if he did not so 
report, he probably would have reported his accident and in-
jury to plaintiff Interstate Electric Company immediately, 
thereby minimizing the aggravation and damage that occurred 
before he was told by Dr. Beck to cease working, and mini-
mizing the prejudice that probably resulted to plaintiff In-
d · al terstate Electric Company through payment of avoidable me ic 
expenses. 
- 6 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Hence, the 48-hour notice requirement and attendant 
reduction of award for failure of an injured employee to 
comply with it was instituted by the Legislature in oart in 
an attempt to encourage an injured employee to seek early 
medical help and enable employers to mitigate the expense 
and damages of injuries which otherwise might be aggravated 
or avoided. If the 48-hour notice period is deemed to commence, 
as is suggested by defendant Inskeep, when an employee first 
realizes that a compensable injury might arise from an acci-
dent, emuloyees generally may be without sufficient motiva-
tion to help themselves or allow their employers to help 
them under circumstances wherein the injured employee takes 
it upon himself to diagnose and treat his own injury or con-
tinue to work notwithstanding it. 
Second, even if it is assumed, arguendo, that the 
48-hour notice period runs, as suggested by defendant Inskeep, 
from the time an employee first realizes that he may have a 
compensable injury arising out of an accident, he offered, 
at the hearing of this matter, no evidence as to when he 
first knew that his injury was comuensable. Clearly, the 
burden of proof in this regard was his, according to the 
case of i.vherri tt vs. Industrial Commission, 100 Utah 68, 110 
P.2d 374 (1941), quoted in plaintiffs' initial brief filed 
in this matter. Also, at the hearing of this matter, he of-
fered no testimony or other evidence which could indicate 
that such burden was met. Further, at rage 3 of his brief, 
- 7 -
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defendant Inskeep states that on September 9, 1976, he re-
quested that his wife obtain an appointment from Dr. Beck. 
As a result, he concludes that "he may have gained knowledge 
on or about September 9, 1976 that a compensable injury was 
possible in this matter " (Emphasis added) 
Consequently, defendant Inskeep admits that he does 
not know when he first gained knowledge that his injury may 
be conpensable or whether such knowledge came to him within 
48 hours of the time he reported the accident and injury to 
his supervisor. 
POINT I I 
DEFENDANT INSKEEP HAS NOT SHOWN THAT HIS FAILURE TO NOTIFY 
PLAINTIFF INTERSTATE ELECTRIC COMPANY OF THE ACCIDENT AND 
INJURY OR TO REPORT TO IT FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT WITHIN 48 
HOURS OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE ACCIDENT AND INJURY WAS NOT 
INTENDED TO MISLEAD OR PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF INTERSTATE ELEC-
TRIC COMPANY AND DID NOT IN FACT MISLEAD OR PREJUDICE IT. 
Defendant Inskeep claims that, upon failure of an 
injured employee to notify his employer of an accident and 
injury or report to his employer for medical treatment within 
48 hours of the accident and injury, the employer must show 
that such delay was prejudicial before the statutory pro-
vision for a 15% reduction in benefits becomes operable. In 
support of his claim, he argues that the facts which may 
indicate such prejudice are solely within the knowledge 
of the employer. However, it is clear that many of such 
facts are solely within the knowledge of the employee. 
-8-
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example, an injured employee may know whether there were any 
witnesses to the accident which resulted in his injury. Were 
the employer unable to locate and interview such witnesses, 
it is possible that it could be prejudiced in its defense 
of a claim; especially so were the claim of a fraudulent 
nature. However, in such an instance, the knowledge of such 
prejudice would be solely within the province of the employ-
ee. As another example, an injured employee may know, through 
consultation with his treating physician, that, had he seen 
his physician or other medical personnel within the 48-hour 
notice rather than after it, or had he not worked under cir-
cumstances wherein medically he should not have, the aggrava-
tion of his injuries would have been substantially less. The 
employer may not have access to such information and, conse-
quently, could be nrejudiced through payment of medical ex-
penses which could have been otherwise mitigated. However, 
such knowledge may be exclusively within the province of 
the employee. 
In an attempt to further support his claim that 
plaintiff Interstate Electric Company has the burden of show-
ing that it was prejudiced through his failure to notify it 
of the accident and injury or report to it for medical treat-
ment within 48 hours of the accident and injury, defendant 
Inskeep cites the cases of Prager v. Lakeridge Theater, 484 
P.2d 404 (Colo. App. 1971), Fukuda v. Peerless Roofing Company, 
Ltd., 523 P.2d 832 (Hawaii 1974), and Phillips v. Helms, Inc., 
439 P.2d 119 (Kan. 1968). 
-9-
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The Prager case cannot be found at the cited lo-
cation or in.the cited volume. Consequently, while it has 
probably been miscited through inadvertence, it does not 
lend weight to the contention of defendant Inskeep under 
circumstances where it cannot he read. In the Fukuda case, 
also cited by defendant Inskeep, the Supreme Court of Hawaii 
held that, once an injured employee has demonstrated a 
satisfactory reason explaining his failure to report as re-
quired by statute, the burden of showing that such delay 
resulted in prejudice to the employer shifts to the employer. 
However, the statute upon which the court's holding is based 
differs from Section 35-1-99. Further, even if the Hawaiian 
court's construction of its own statute were given weight 
in the case at bar, defendant Inskeep failed, during the course 
of the hearing of this matter, to offer evidence indicating 
that he had satisfactory reasons for his failure to report 
the accident and injury to plaintiff Interstate Electric 
Company or report to it for medical treatment within 48 hours 
of the occurrence of the accident and injury. 
I 
Nor does the case of Phillips v. Helms, Inc. lend 
support to defendant Inskeep's contention that plaintiff In-
terstate Electric Company has the burden of showing that it 
was prejudiced through his failure to notify it of the 
accident and injury or report to it within 48 hours of the 
accident and injury. There, while the court held that the 
employer had the burden of showing that it was prejudiced bv 
-10-
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the injured employee's failure to give timely notice of his 
accident and injury, its holding was based u~on a Kansas 
statute which specifically placed such a burden upon the 
employer. Inasmuch as Section 35-1-99 contains no provision 
for the allocation of the burden of proof with regard to 
the prejudice which may result to an employer as a result 
of an employee's failure to timely notify it of his acci-
dent and injury or report to it for medical treatmen~, the 
Phillius case is clearly not persuasive or in point. 
Section 35-1-99 provides that, under circumstances 
where an injured employee fails to notify his employer of 
the accident and injury or report to it for medical treat-
ment within 48 hours, the compensation otherwise provided him 
by the Workmen's Compensation Act shall not be reduced 15% 
unless (1) his employer was not mislead or prejudiced by such 
failure, and (2) such emnlovee did not intend to mislead or 
prejudice his employer in making a defense. 
Defendant Inskeep claims that plaintiff Interstate 
Electric Company has the burden of showing that it was pre-
judiced in order for the statutory provision for a 15% 
reduction in benefits to become operable. As indicated earl-
ier in the plaintiff's initial brief, the burden of proof 
in that regard is, according to the general rule, upon the 
employee. 
However, even if it is assumed, arguendo, that 
such burden is upon plaintiff Interstate Electric Company 
-11-
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and that it has failed to meet it, the burden of showing 
that he did not intend to mislead or prejudice plaintiff 
Interstate Electric Company in its defense is upon defendant 
Inskeep. Clearly, no one but him could know whether his 
failure to comply with the notice requirements of Section 
35-1-99 was or was not intended to mislead or prejudice 
plaintiff Interstate Electric Company in its defense. Fur-
ther, according to the general rule, as indicated in nlaintiffs' 
initial brief, such burden is upon defendant Inskeep. Not-
withstanding, defendant Inskeep did not raise or discuss 
the issue in his brief. The reason for such failure is 
clear -- there is no evidence in the record which indicates 
or even intimates that defendant Inskeep has even tried to 
meet his burden in this regard, much less actually meet it. 
Consequently, even if it is assumed that plaintiff Inter-
state Electric Company must shoulder the burden of showing 
that it was prejudiced by the failure of defendant Inskeep 
to comply with the notice requirements of Section 35-1-99, 
and that it had failed to meet such burden, defendant In-
skeep must, in order to avoid a 15% reduction in benefits, 
show that he did not intend to mislead or prejudice plain-
tiff Interstate Electric Company through such failure. The 
statutory language of Section 35-1-99 is clear -- in order 
for an employee, who has failed to notify his employer of 
his accident and injury or report to it for medical treatment 
within the prescribed period, to avoid a 15% reduction in 
-12-
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benefits, it must be shown that his employer was not in 
fact prejudiced thereby and that the injured employee did not 
intend to mislead or prejudice his employer in making a 
defense. 
Consequently, since defendant Inskeep has failed 
to offer evidence which would indicate that he did not 
intend to mislead or prejudice plaintiff Interstate Electric 
Companv through his failure to comply with the notice require-
ments of Section 35-1-99, his award, according to its terms, 
must be reduced 15%. 
SUMMARY 
It is respectfully submitted that the 48-hour period 
within which defendant Inskeep was required to notify plain-
tiff Interstate Electric Comnanv or report to it for medical 
treat began to run upon the occurrence of his accident and 
injury. Inasmuch as defendant Inskeep failed to comply with 
such statutory provisions, he must show, in order to avoid 
a 15% reduction in the benefits to which he would otherwise 
be entitled, (1) that plaintiff Interstate Electric Company 
was not prejudiced by such failure, and (2) that he did not 
intend to mislead or prejudice plaintiff Interstate Electric 
Company in its defense. He has failed to meet either such 
burden and consequently, the award of the Industrial Commission 
must be vacated insofar as it fails to reduce the award of 
defendant Inskeep by 15%, as nrovided by Section 35-1-99, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended. 
-13-
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of January, 1979. 
HANSnN' RUSSON' HANSON & m 
G cCC ~ r r~lc 
W''ILLIA!I F. HANSON 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
702 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed, postage prepaid, 
two (2) copies of the foregoing Plaintiffs' Brief to A. Wally 
Sandack, attorney for defendant Inskeep, 370 East 500 South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, and to Robert B. Hansen, attor-
ney for defendant Industrial Commission of Utah, 236 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, on this 5th day of 
January, 1979. 
I 
'0" ,Jt °'-- ((~0-----,_ 
WILLIAM F. HANSON 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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